


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700912



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 12 September 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970


Weekly average for each month




JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1970

Weekly data as reported


US BATTLE DEATHS




dropped to 53 from last week's 87. This is only one higher than the 2½ year low recorded the week ending 22 August.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




decreased sharply to 218 from last week's total of 326 which reflected the highpoint of enemy activity at the end of the month. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at zero for the week. The total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 remains at some 65,000-66,500.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




declined slightly to 839 from last week's 856.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



rose to 1567 from last week's 1321 reflecting the increased intensity of ground contacts in MR's 1 and 4.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces rose to 73% from last week's 64%.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity remained at a low level throughout South Vietnam, but pressure continued to be applied on Fire Support Base O'Reilly in Military Region (MR) I and evidence is mounting that the Communists are planning a further increase in the pace of their activities in the northernmost provinces. To the south, the return of several Communist units to their traditional base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnam border of MR 3 may presage increased activity in this sector.

Major friendly force offensive operations in each of the Royal Lao Military Regions accounted for the increased military tempo in Laos last week. Operation 870, being conducted in MR I, continued to engage the enemy, although plans have been made to withdraw the friendly forces involved. In MR II, action continues in the Muong Soui area with friendly forces suffering some setbacks. Meanwhile, in MR's III and IV, major paramilitary operations directed at the enemy's supply corridor in the lower panhandle are underway (Operation GAUNTLET). In MR V, the Lao Army launched a rice-denial sweep that will continue for a month.

In Cambodia, the Communists have been relatively quiet. The government's most ambitious military operation of the war attained an initial success when an amphibious relief convoy reached Kompong Thom. A second ground relief convoy enroute to Kompong Thom, however, is stalled by enemy resistance and road interdiction efforts. Southwest of Phnom Penh, major Communist maneuver elements are regrouping in an area some 20 miles south of Kompong Speu City. Meanwhile, some Communist units appear to be moving into traditional base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnam border which may somewhat reduce enemy pressure east of Phnom Penh.

Infiltration

No new confirmed South Vietnam-bound infiltration groups were detected this week, hence the low level of actual personnel infiltration apparently continues and the infiltration total since 23 October 1969 remains at 65,000 - 66,500. Nonetheless, ambiguous or unclear evidence suggesting that the North Vietnamese may soon start major infiltration inputs continues to crop up. At least four southward moving personnel groups bearing abnormal designators have been observed in North Vietnam, though their final destinations cannot yet be determined. The significance of the unusual designators applied to these four groups is obscure, but we must always be alert to the possibility that the North Vietnamese could re-order or revise their basic group numbering system. A 13 September intercept states that on each of the nights of 16-17 September and on 23, 24, 25, and 26 September "There will be one large group coming down to T-12 (a way-station in North Vietnam, south of Vinh) and the comrades must make preparation to continuously receive them." The 13 September intercept and the four abnormally designated groups could be related (though at this stage we cannot be sure) and both may be related to the 28 August message that spoke of plans to infiltrate a group a day starting in September. Whatever Hanoi's intent, however, there has as yet been no discernible rise in actual infiltration spotted moving through Laos.

South Vietnam Developments

Prospects for an early passage of at least some of the emergency economic legislation desired by President Thieu appear to have improved considerably. Senator Le Phat Dat, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, has now agreed to give his full support to the government's "program law," after having stalled the bill in committee pending assurances that the 30 August elections would not be fraudulent. The legislation may be approved by the Senate this week, with action by the lower house expected before the end of the month. Although watered down from the original lower house version, the Senate version may contain the main essentials, including provision for a dual exchange rate which would in effect result in a partial devaluation of the piaster. Meanwhile, the government's national bank is planning to go ahead on its own this week to raise interest rates as part of the anti-inflationary program.

Vice President Ky seems determined to visit the U.S. in order to gain the public exposure he feels he needs, but he is wavering on whether to make a visit in connection with the 3 October "March for Victory" or to wait until after the U.S. elections in November. He has been advised informally that the U.S. is not in favor of the trip as presently planned, and he has stated that he does not want to do anything which would be "detrimental to President Nixon's political plans." Our Saigon Station reports that on the basis of what Ky is telling his friends, a solution may be emerging whereby Ky would prolong his stay in Paris until after the U.S. elections and then proceed to the U.S. in a low-key, private capacity. Given Ky's mercurial temperament and the fact that he is clearly wavering on at least the timing of his contemplated visit, it is hard to predict what Ky will actually do. Indeed Ky himself probably has not made up his own mind as of this writing.

~~Top Secret~~